Sequential sealed first-price and open ascending bid auctions are studied.
We relax the assumption of a single period auction and study sequential auctions.
We take into account that winning an item may a ect the winning bidder's values in the next auction.
A sequential auction game is a selling mechanism commonly used when a seller has a number of related items for sale. Typically, an individual item is allocated to a bidder at each round by means of either a sealed bid first-price or an open English auction. Usually the same auction format is used for early and late items, and there is no change in the auction format over time. As the auction proceeds sequentially, a bidder's valuation for an additional item may depend on the number of items acquired so far. Substitutes arise if the value of an additional item falls in the number of acquired items, while complements arise if the value increases in the number of acquired items. This paper explores the relationship between substitutes and complements, and the choice of auction format both from the bidders' and the auctioneer's point of view.
Substitutability is pervasive in a number of settings including sequential real-estate auctions, sequential eBay auctions for used durables, and livestock auctions. What these auctions have in common is that the incremental value of owning a second unit is lower than it was for the first. A private house buyer is interested in the purchase of a single house only, an eBay bidder may wish to buy a single durable good. Similarly, a farmer that wishes to purchase one bull for breeding will value a second one much less than the first 1 . Substitutability also arises in sequential procurement contracting when the technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale: The cost of the marginal contract is higher when the bidder is already committed to a previously won and uncompleted contract than when the bidder is uncommitted.
Complementarity arises when the value of an additional item increases with the number of items acquired so far: A complete cycle of paintings or a complete china placesetting may have a higher value than the sum of the individual item values.
Complementarity may arise for procurement contracts when there are learning-bydoing e ects or experience e ects. Additionally, if an up-front investment is required to undertake a project, then this may induce complementarities: The first period winner has already sunk the investment so that she is more competitive in the second period auction.
Empirical studies documenting the importance of substitutes and complements in sequential auctions are abound: Substitutes are found in industries in which bidders' capacity is limited, as shown in recent papers such as Mireia Jofre-Bonet and Martin Pesendorfer (2003) for sequential highway-paving procurement auctions; and John List, Daniel Millimet and Michael Price (2004) for sequential timber auctions. Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) devise an empirical technique to measure consistently the e ect of substitutes and show that the bid mark-up increase due to the existence of the substitution e ect is substantial. Zulehner (2002) describes a negative correlation between the initial and the subsequent bids by the same bidder in sequential cattle auctions.
Catherine D. Wolfram (1998) documents that bids at sequential electricity auctions include a startup price and a no-load price, which enables bidders to indicate complementarities in electricity generation between adjacent time periods. James J.
Anton and Dennis A. Yao (1987) show that complementarities arise in sequential competition for defense contracts as the incumbent firm may achieve a higher experience level and thus a lower cost. Neil Gandal (1997) documents complementarities in sequential cable television license auctions. Incumbency advantage in sequential procurement auctions for school milk contracts may arise due to sunk investments by diaries, see Pesendorfer (2000) . There are also complementarities between adjacent school milk contracts, see Robert C. Marshall, Matthew E. Rai , Jean-Francois Richard and Steven Schulenberg (2002) .
Motivated by the empirical studies, we consider a buyer's procurement auction model in which bidders (sellers) have private information about their costs. We consider a two period procurement auction game in which every period a single contract is o ered for sale. There are two bidders who become privately informed about their contract costs at the beginning of each period. We assume that the identity of the winner of the first auction is publicly observed before the second auction starts, and we consider situations in which winning the first contract may a ect the distribution of the winning bidder's costs at the next auction. We shall say that the items are substitutes if at the second auction the first period winning bidder has on average a higher cost than a loosing bidder, and the items are complements if instead the first period winning bidder has on average a lower cost than a loosing bidder. The asymmetry in the second period arises endogenously as it depends on the first period's auction outcome. We study the payo and procurement cost ranking of sealed first-price and open ascending bid or second-price auctions.
As most of the empirical auction evidence on substitutes and complements arises in procurement auctions, in this paper we state our results in terms of a buyer's procurement auction. An alternative model formulation exists for a seller's auction in which bidders have private information about their willingness to pay and the seller awards the item to the high bidder. This alternative model formulation has the same mathematical structure than the one we have chosen, and therefore, our subsequent results can be restated in terms of a seller's auction with the appropriate changes in place.
To our knowledge there is no prior work on the relationship between optimal sequential auctions and the substitutes or complements property of the items auctioned.
The theoretical literature on sequential auctions has focused on the martingale property of sequential auction prices and deviations thereof, see Weber (1983) . Empirical evidence on declining prices is documented in Orley Ashenfelter (1989) for wine auctions. R. Preston McAfee and Daniel Vincent (1993) explain declining prices with a model in which items are perfect substitutes, each bidder acquires at most one item, and bidders are risk averse. Carolyn Pitchik and Andrew Schotter (1988) study the e ect of bidder budget-constraint on the second period auction outcome. Jean-Pierre
Benoit and Vijay Krishna (2001) study whether it is better to sell the more valuable item first or second when bidders face budget constraints and information is complete.
Fernando Branco (1998) shows that with complements auction prices decline.
Simultaneous multi-unit auctions are studied by number of authors. When goods are complements, then selling the items in a bundle can increase seller's revenues, as shown in Thomas R. Palfrey (1983) , Jonathan Levin (1997) and Mark Armstrong (2000) . These papers di er from our setting in that we do not consider simultaneous sales, but consider sequential auctions. In our setting, bidders can condition their behavior on past auction outcomes which are publicly observed.
The paper is organized as follows: The next section describes the two period model. We assume that the first period winner draws the second period cost from a distinct cost distribution than a loosing bidder. Section II illustrates the bidding equilibrium in a first-price auction. Section III considers the bidding equilibrium in the second-price auction. Section IV describes our main results. It compares the first-price and second-price equilibrium in terms of procurement cost and bidders' rent. Section V illustrates the procurement cost minimizing auction rule. Section VI concludes.
I. Model
A two period game is considered.
2 Every period a single contract is o ered for sale. There are two bidders which are denoted by i = 1, 2. 3 We sometimes refer to the bidder that won (lost) the first period auction as the "winner" ("looser"). A bid in the procurement auction indicates a price at which the bidder is willing to provide the project. The price may depend on the bidder's cost for the project, the perception about the cost of the other bidder, and on the rules of the auction game. We make the following assumptions on the bidders' costs and the auction game:
Private cost: Each bidder observes privately his/her own cost draw at the beginning of every period. The second period's cost draw is not known in the first period.
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The assumption arises when time elapses between periods, or when the properties of the second contract become known at the beginning of the second period only.
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The period cost draw is private information and not observed by other bidders or the auctioneer. The first period cost is drawn from the distribution function F . The distribution of the second period cost draw depends on the outcome of the first period auction game. The winner draws from the distribution function F w and the looser from F l . The distributions are continuous, di erentiable, and have common inter-
The restriction to two bidders allows us to adopt equilibrium characterization and uniqueness results for asymmetric auctions, see Maskin and Riley (1996 , 2000a , 2000b ). 4 A model in which second period cost draws are known in period one would be qualitatively similar, but would entail the additional feature that bidders update their beliefs about second period costs based on the observed first period bid. 5 In highway paving contracts, the auctoineer reveals upcoming contracts a short period before the letting date only. Limited updating can also arise when the auctioneer does not reveal the first period bids but reveals the first period winner only. An example in which information updating is limited in this manner are sequential London Bus route auctions.
probability density function.
We assume that the cost distributions satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property, see Milgrom (1981) . Based on this property, we define items as substitutes or complements using the two conditions below.
Condition 1: We shall say the items are substitutes if in the second period the winner is more likely to have a higher cost than a looser in the likelihood ratio sense,
The substitutes property (1) has the following intuitive implications on the cost dis-
these properties is given in the appendix.
Condition 2:
We shall say the items complements if in the second period the winner is more likely to have a lower second period cost than a looser in the likelihood ratio sense,
Auction game: We shall consider two distinct auction games in the period game:
(i) a first-price sealed-bid auction in which the low bidder wins and pays his bid; and (ii) a second-price sealed-bid auction in which the low bidder wins and pays the bid of the other bidder, which under our assumptions is strategically equivalent to an open ascending price auction. We shall ignore ties, as the probability of a tie is zero with continuous probability distributions.
Bidders are risk neutral. They discount future payo s with the common discount factor (0, 1). Bidders' objective is to maximize the sum of first period and discounted second period payo s.
A strategy in the first period specifies a bid as a function of the cost, b f (c). A strategy in the second period specifies a bid in the second period for the winning and loosing bidder as a function of the period cost, b w (c) , b l (c). We omit the dependence of the second period strategy on the first period privately observed cost and publicly observed bids as these variables are not payo relevant in the second period, and will not a ect the outcome.
We are interested in symmetric Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria, PBNE.
Definition: A PBNE is a tuple (b f , b w , b l ) such that (i) the strategies constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium; and (ii) the beliefs are consistent with Bayes rule.
The next section examines bidding behavior in standard auctions. We begin with the first-price auction, and then we examine the second-price auction. Finally, we compare the auction outcomes and illustrate the auction rule that minimizes procurement costs.
II. First-Price Auction
In a first-price auction, the low bidder wins and receives his bid. The period payo of the winner is given by the bid minus the cost, while the looser receives zero.
In a two period game, the first period bid has to take into account how it will a ect subsequent choices. With substitutes, the first period winning bidder will be less e cient in the second period introducing an opportunity cost of winning. With complements, the winning bidder will be more e cient in the second period, and an opportunity benefit of winning arises. We shall illustrate how the first period bid choice takes the opportunity cost (benefit) into account. We shall start at the second period, and then, working backwards, examine the first period equilibrium.
In period 2 under both cases, substitutes and complements, there will be one e cient and one ine cient bidder. With substitutes, the winner will be less e cient in the second period in the sense of condition (1), while with complements, the looser will be less e cient in the second period in the sense of condition (2).
The existence and the uniqueness of an equilibrium in first-price asymmetric auctions has been established by a number of authors, including Riley (1996,2000) . We shall proceed by assuming that a unique equilibrium in the second period exists with equilibrium bid functions (b w , b l ).
The second period equilibrium allocation rule, ignoring the zero probability event of ties, is given by, denote the interim expected winning probabilities,
w denote the ex ante expected second period profits of the first period loosing and winning bidders, respectively. Following Myerson (1981) , the ex ante expected second period profits reduces to the expected virtual rent, (ii) Under condition (2), when the contracts are complements, b w (c) > b l (c), and
The Lemma illustrates intuitive properties of asymmetric first-price auctions. The less e cient bidder bids more aggressively than the more e cient bidder. The reason is that the less e cient bidder expects tougher competition in the auction than the more e cient bidder. The strategic e ect has the following implications: When contracts are substitutes, the first period winning bidder knows she is on average less e cient in the second period, and charges a smaller mark-up over costs than a loosing bidder. The reduction in the mark-up implies that she wins more frequently in the second period than is e cient, i.e. winning despite of having a higher cost draw than the opponent. In turn, this implies that she makes an expected profit larger than is e cient.
When contracts are complements, the first period winning bidder charges a higher mark-up over costs than a loosing bidder, and thus she wins less frequently and makes less rent than is socially e cient.
Next, we consider the remaining element in the equilibrium construction: The first period bid strategy. The asymmetry in the second period will a ect the first period's bid choice as it introduces an opportunity cost (benefit) of winning. To see, how the opportunity cost (benefit) arises, observe that the winning bidder's first period continuation payo can then be written as £ b c + The optimal first period bid will take both, the opportunity cost (benefit) of winning and the period cost realization, into account. As the opportunity cost (benefit) does not depend on the period cost realization, it simply shifts the cost by a constant term, £ F P l F P w ¤ , and the equilibrium bid function takes the well known form.
Proposition 1
The first period equilibrium bid function in the first-price auction equals:
The proof follows from standard arguments for first-price auctions, see for example Proposition 2 in Riley and Samuelson (1981) . The equilibrium bid in equation (3) has an intuitive explanation. It equals the cost plus a mark-up. The mark-up has two components: (i) the static mark-up equal to the expected opponent's cost conditional on the opponent's cost exceeding the own cost, and (ii) a dynamic mark-up equal to the opportunity cost of winning.
There are two features of the equilibrium worth emphasizing: First, the sign of the dynamic mark-up under the first-price auction coincides with the sign of the opportunity cost under the e cient allocation rule. It is positive when the contracts are substitutes, and negative when the goods are complements 7 .
Second, when contracts are substitutes, the dynamic mark-up is smaller under the first-price auction rule than under the e cient allocation rule:
When contracts are complements, the dynamic mark-up is larger under the first-price auction rule than under the e cient allocation rule:
7 See also Branco (1998) , who shows that sequential auction prices decline with complements.
These features follow from the payo inequalities in Lemma 1 and are explained by the strategic bid shading in first-price auctions.
The features imply that when contracts are substitutes, the first period mark-up is higher with the e cient second period allocation than with the allocation of the first-price auction. On the other hand, when contracts are complements, the first period mark-up is lower with the e cient second period allocation than with the allocation of the first-price auction.
We shall see later-on that the first period mark-up ranking will in essence determine the bidder's rent and procurement cost ranking. Before proceeding, we shall illustrate an equilibrium in the second-price auction in more detail.
III. Second-Price Auction
This section examines the second-price auction. We establish that there exists an e cient equilibrium.
In a second-price procurement auction the low bidder wins. The price paid equals the opponent's bid and does not depend on the bidder's own bid.
In a one period model, the second-price auction has a dominant strategy equilibrium in which bidders submit a bid equal to their cost, b = c. In the dynamic two-period auction game, with positive discounting > 0 and when the items are substitutes or complements, it is no longer an equilibrium to bid the cost. The reason is that winning confers an opportunity cost (benefit) at the next auction, which will influence optimal bidding and render bidding of the own cost unprofitable. An optimal bid choice will take into account both, the cost of the project and the opportunity cost. We shall again begin with a discussion of the second period payo s, then quantify the opportunity cost, and finally examine the first period bid choice.
In period 2 under both cases, substitutes and complements, there will be an asymmetry between a loosing and a winning bidder. With substitutes, the winner will be less e cient in the second period in the sense of condition (1), while with complements, the looser will be less e cient in the second period in the sense of condition (2).
The second-price auction has a dominant strategy equilibrium in the second period in which bidders submit a bid equal to their cost, b = c. 8 The dominant strategy equilibrium yields the e cient outcome with second period ex ante expected payo s
given by:
In the first period of the game, the period's gain plus the discounted expected and enters as an additive constant when the bidder wins the item similar to the firstprice auction. As illustrated in the following proposition, the symmetric first period equilibrium bidding strategy will take the added constant into account.
8 When the cost support is bounded, C < , then there exist also pooling equilibria, for example b w = 0 and b l = C. The described pooling equilibrium is not a dominant strategy equilibrium and it is not e cient. As customary, we shall ignore pooling equilibria and focus our analysis on the e cient separating equilibrium, b = c.
Proposition 2 The symmetric first period equilibrium bid function in the secondprice auction equals:
The proof follows from standard arguments for second-price auctions by which bidders bid their cost and therefore there is no static mark-up component. The argument is based on the second-price auctions' property that the bid does not a ect the price paid, and a ects the winning probability only. The property implies that bidding below cost may result in a loss as then a contract may be won at a price below cost. Similarly, bidding above cost may also result in a loss as it hurts the chances of winning an item with a positive expected payo .
The equilibrium bidding strategy in (4) has an intuitive explanation. With both, substitutes and complements, the opportunity cost (benefit) of winning equals the discounted payo di erence in the second period auction game, £ SP l SP w ¤ , and will be passed on to the auctioneer as an additive mark-up (mark-down) independent of the cost realization in the first period.
Observe though that the first period bid strategy, b
is not a dominant strategy equilibrium as the value of the mark-up depends on the opponent's equilibrium bid strategy in the second period. If the opponent were to use a distinct bid function, say to bid half the second period cost only, then the optimal dynamic mark-up of the bidder would be altered and reduced.
Observe also that the PBNE in the second-price auction retains the e ciency property of the static second-price auction.
Corollary 1
The PBNE in the second-price auction is e cient.
Corollary 1 follows from two properties of the equilibrium bid functions. These properties are: (i) that the mark-up is independent of the cost realization; and (ii)
that the mark-up is identical for both bidders. These two properties imply that the low cost bidder will submit the low bid.
So far, we have characterized the bidding equilibrium in the first-price and secondprice auction. The next section compares the equilibria.
IV. Optimal Sequential Auction
This section describes our main results. We compare the outcome under the firstprice auction and the second-price auction. Subsection A considers this issue from the perspective of the bidders and compares the bidders' rents. Subsection B compares the total procurement cost associated to the first-price and second-price auctions.
A. Bidders' Rent
The equilibrium characterization in sections II and III allows us to determine a bidder's rent under the first-price and second-price auction rule. By using the envelope theorem and integration by parts, the ex ante expected equilibrium game payo in the first-price auction, F P , and in the e cient second-price auction, e , equal:
Equation (5) consists of the usual expression for the bidder's information rent in the first period, and a modified expression in the second period that captures the expected payo of a loosing bidder. The modification arises as competition in the first period diminishes any expected payo advantages (or disadvantages) of the winning bidder.
This can be seen most clearly in the analysis in sections II and III, where the first period bid passes any subsequent payo losses (gains) of the winner on to the seller by adding the opportunity cost (benefit) of winning to the bid. Thus both, the winning and the loosing bidder, expect to receive the loosing bidder's second period rent only.
The following Theorem compares bidder's rent between the two auction formats.
Theorem 1 (Payo Ranking) (i) Under condition (1), when the contracts are substitutes, F P < e .
(ii) Under condition (2), when the contracts are complements, e < F P .
This Theorem establishes that bidders prefer the e cient second-price auction when the contracts are substitutes, while they prefer the first-price auction when contracts are complements. The result is already apparent in the di erential bid shading behavior illustrated at the end of section II, as with substitutes (complements), bidders' first period bids and thus first period payo s are lower (higher) with the first-price auction than in the e cient second-price auction.
Equation (5) also shows that the payo comparison across auction formats reduces to a comparison of the second period expected rent to the loosing bidder. The result in Theorem 1 is then easily explained as with substitutes (complements), the second period loosing bidder's rent is lowest under the first-price (e cient second-price) auction rule as is shown in Lemma 1 in section II. As described earlier, the intuition for this result lies in the fact that with substitutes (complements) the loosing bidder bids less (more) aggressively than the winning bidder in the first-price auction resulting in a lower (higher) winning probability and thus a lower (higher) rent than that associated with the socially e cient outcome in the second-price auction.
Next, we consider the procurement cost.
B. Procurement Cost
The total procurement cost of the first-price and the e cient second-price auction, P C F P and P C e , equals the cost of the winning bidder plus the bidder's rent:
where the first period procurement cost can be attributed to the usual virtual cost of a bidder, c + F/F 0 . The second period procurement cost di ers from the usual virtual cost expression. It equals the cost of the winning bidder, c l q j l + c w q j w , plus twice the second period rent of the loosing bidder, 2 · F l /F 0 l , for j = F P, e. The expression involving twice the loosing bidder's rent arises as expected payo advantages (disadvantages) of the winning bidder in the second period are passed on to the auctioneer with the first period bid choice, and both, winning and loosing, bidders expect to receive the loosing bidder's rent in the second period.
The procurement cost di erence between the e cient second-price and the firstprice auction arises in the second period only. 9 The magnitude of the di erence 9 As bidders are ex-ante symmetric in period 1, the auction format does not matter as both the first-price and the second price auction select the e cient bidder as the winner.
amounts to:
The first term on the right hand side measures the e ciency loss of the first-price auction. This term is always negative. The second term on the right hand side reflects the di erence in second period payo of the loosing bidder between the e cient allocation rule and the allocation rule of the first-price auction. Lemma 1 shows that with substitutes, the term is positive, while with complements it is negative.
The following Theorem states our central result.
Theorem 2 (Procurement Cost Ranking)
(i) Under condition (1), when the contracts are substitutes, P C e > P C F P .
(ii) Under condition (2), when the contracts are complements, P C e < P C F P .
Theorem 2 gives a clear policy recommendation: The e cient second-price auction is optimal when contracts are complements, while the first-price auction is optimal when contracts are substitutes. Observe also that the ranking in Theorem 2 is the reverse ranking of Theorem 1, which illustrated the bidders' rent ranking. The intuition is again based on the feature that bidders bid more (less) aggressively in the first-price auction than in the e cient auction when contracts are substitutes (complements). This implies that when the items are substitutes (complements) a lower (higher) procurement cost under the first-price than under the e cient second-price auction rule.
Theorem 2 may seem surprising in light of a recent result in Maskin and Riley (2000a) , which establishes that the procurement cost (or revenue) ranking between first-price and open auctions is ambiguous when bidders are asymmetric. 10 The ambiguity result in Maskin and Riley is obtained under the assumption of a single period auction game in which the bidders' asymmetry is taken as exogenously given. In our model, this scenario is equivalent to considering the second period auction game in isolation only. In contrast, Theorem 2 shows that when the asymmetries arise endogenously due to the first period auction outcome, then the ambiguity disappears and the total procurement cost, consisting of the first and the second periods' procurement cost, has a clear and unambigous ranking across auction formats.
In order to illuminate the ranking result in more detail, we shall use the techniques developed in Myerson (1981) to illustrate the procurement cost minimizing allocation rule. Doing so, will allow us to interpret the procurement cost ranking more intuitively. This is done in the next section.
V. Procurement Cost Minimization
We conclude the discussion with a brief illustration of the auction rule that minimizes the procurement cost. The illustration will enable us to interpret the procurement cost ranking of the first-price and e cient second-price auction more intuitively.
10 Maskin and Riley (2000a) show that there is a class of distribution functions such that the first-price auction is preferred. The class has the feature that asymmetries arise due to a shift (or stretch) in the distribution. They also show that there is a second class of distribution functions
such that the open auction is preferred. The asymmetry in the second class is based on a shift of probability mass to the upper end point in the support.
We explore the commitment solution in which the auctioneer fixes the auction rule for periods one and two before the bidding starts, and we do not permit the auctioneer to modify the auction rule after period one.
The techniques developed in Myerson (1981) allow us to address this problem.
We consider the set of incentive compatible auction rules that satisfy the voluntary participation constraints and incentive constraints in every period. Let q 
The incentive constraints take the form,
S and for i = 1, 2, t = 1, 2.
and the voluntary participation constraint take the form, where the participation payo in the first period equals at least the expected payo of a bidder that participates in the second period only, R
constraint assumes that a bidder that refrains from bidding in the first period cannot be prevented from participating in the second period auction. This formulation of the (VP) constraint comes closest to the (implicit) assumption in the sequential first-price and second-price auction, analyzed earlier, in which a bidder cannot be prevented from participating in the second period auction.
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The following Lemma states an expression for the procurement cost. We show in the appendix, by using the techniques developed in Myerson (1981) , that this expression applies under (VP) and (IC).
Lemma 2 In any incentive compatible auction rule that satisfies (VP) and (IC), the functions Q t i (c) for i, t = 1, 2, are monotone decreasing and the procurement cost equals:
11 A weaker (VP) constraint arises if a non-participating bidder is banned from the second auction.
With the weaker constraint, the first period reservation value becomes zero, 1 i (c, c) 0 for all c S and for i = 1, 2, and the auctioneer can extract all the rent in the second period by charging bidders a fee in period one equal to the expected second period's rent and by using the e cient second-price auction in the second period. As the fee is collected in period one, before the second period private information is observed, it will not a ect subsequent behavior and enable the auctioneer to collect all the (expected) rent.
The first term in the procurement cost accounts for the virtual cost in the first period; the second term reflects the voluntary participation constraint; and, the third term accounts for the second period virtual cost.
The optimal auction rule maximizes the above expression. Observe that the first expression is the usual procurement cost expression, which is maximized with a firstprice or second-price auction. The second term reflects the voluntary participation constraint. The third expression di ers as it takes the dynamic bidding e ect into account. Pointwise minimization of the third expression yields the optimal rule (we ignore again the zero probability event of a tie).
Proposition 3 The procurement cost minimizing solution is a first-price (or secondprice) auction followed by an auction with the following allocation rule:
and q l (c w , c l ) = 1 q w (c w , c l ).
The optimal second period allocation rule assigns an increased winning probability to the bidder who won the first period item under both, complements and substitutes.
The amount of the increase relative to the e cient rule equals twice the virtual rent of the loosing bidder. The optimal choice balances two opposing e ects: On the one hand, an increase in the second period winning probability leads to an increase in second period rent di erential between the winning and the loosing bidder. In turn, the increased rent di erential implies more aggressive bidding and thus induces the benefit of lower procurement cost in the first period. On the other hand, the increase in the second period winning probability comes at the cost of an increased ine ciency in the second period. At the optimum, the marginal benefit of the reduced first period procurement cost equals the marginal cost of the second period e ciency loss, and the usual marginal condition holds.
The result in Proposition 3 allows us to illustrate the ranking obtained in Theorem 2 intuitively. A graphical illustration is given in Figures 1 and 2 
To the northwest of line I , the second period contract is awarded to the loosing bidder, and to the southeast of line I , the second period contract is awarded to the winning bidder. Line I e describes the awarding rule under the e cient second-price auction, which coincides with the 45 degree line. To the northwest of line I e , the second-price auction awards the second period contract to the loosing bidder, while to the southeast of line I , it awards the second period contract to the winning bidder.
[ Figures 1 and 2 about here]
Figures 1 and 2 also illustrate the outcome under the first-price auction. In both cases, the asymmetric first-price equilibrium can be calculated numerically 12 and the resulting optimal first-price allocation rule is described by line I F P . To the northwest of line I F P the first-price auction awards the second period contract to the loosing bidder, while to the southeast of line I F P the first-price auction awards the second period contract to the winning bidder. We are now in a position to compare all three auction rules, and highlight the key features of the comparison:
The e cient line I e is to the right of the procurement cost minimizing line I . The reason is that the winning bidder receives the item less frequently under the e cient second-price auction than under the procurement cost minimizing rule.
The first-price awarding rule I F P lies entirely either to the left or to the right of the e cient rule I e . With substitutes, the first-price awarding rule I F P is to the left, while with complements it is to the right of I e .
Now, consider the case of substitutes, as illustrated in Figure 1 . With substitutes, the first-price awarding rule I F P is to the left of the e cient rule I e , as it assigns the item to the winning bidder more frequent than is socially e cient. As a result, the first-price cut-o rule is closer to the optimal rule I than the e cient rule. We can conclude that the first-price auction dominates the e cient second-price auction.
Finally, consider the case of complements, as illustrated in Figure 2 . With complements, the first-price rule I F P lies to the right of the e cient rule I e , and is thus further away from the procurement cost minimizing rule I than the e cient rule.
So, in this case, we can conclude that the first-price auction is dominated by the 12 Marshall, Meurer, Richard and Stromquist (1994) describe numerical methods to calculate the asymmetric first-price auction equillibrium b l , b w . The boundary is then the set of points, such that
second-price auction in terms of e ciency and also in terms of reduced procurement costs.
VI. Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined optimal sequential auctions when items are complements or substitutes in the sense that an item's value increases or decreases with the number of items acquired already. We have found that the existence of complementarity or substitutability between sequentially auctioned items has consequences on the procurement costs associated with di erent auction rules. Our analysis has definite policy recommendations for an auctioneer that wants to minimize procurement costs:
(i) If the items are substitutes, then it is optimal to use a sealed first-price auction
rather than an open ascending price auction (or sealed second-price auction).
(ii) If the items are complements, then it is optimal to use an open ascending price auction (or sealed second-price auction) rather than a sealed first-price auction.
The explanation is intuitive: Enhancing the winning probability of the first round winner in the second period leads to increased competition in the first period, and thus to lower procurement costs. With substitutes, the first-price auction correctly favors the first period winning bidder yielding lower procurement costs than the socially e cient second-price auction, which does not favor any bidder. In contrast, when items are complements, the first-price auction incorrectly favors the first period loosing bidder resulting in an increased procurement cost vis-a-vis the e cient second-price auction.
It is tempting to try to explain observed auction rules and relate them to our results on the complementarity and the substitutability of the items for sale: Casual empiricism suggests that job contract bidding for governmental institutions tends to be conducted in a sealed bid format, while fine art, antiques, wine, and livestock are mostly conducted openly.
The empirical evidence from procurement auctions for highway paving jobs and forest timber sales described earlier confirms the existence of substitutability between the items. To the extent that these procurement jobs do have a technology with decreasing returns to scale, the auctioneers' chosen first-price sealed auction format is adequate in order to minimize procurement costs.
The empirical evidence on art auctions is largely anecdotal and there is no conclusive evidence on complementarities. and an open ascending auction should be preferred. When faced with bidders that desire to acquire at most one item each, the auctioneer should anticipate the existence of substitutes and a sealed first-price auction should be chosen. For example, some of the empirical evidence on livestock auctions suggests the existence of substitutes and, according to our findings, it may be beneficial to the auctioneer to switch to a sealed bid format in those instances.
Although there is some evidence that the cost minimizing auction format is chosen in a number of settings, a more throughout empirical investigation of the auctioneer's choice of auction format is required to answer this question in more detail and to 13 See Ashenfelter and Graddy (2004) for a survey on art auctions.
understand its implications in each case.
Properties implied by condition (1):
Proof. Condition (1), the monotone likelihood ratio property, implies
Integrating both sides of the inequality over c 0 from the lower endpoint of the support S to c, yields
which implies property (ii).
Next, integrate both sides of (A1) over c from c 0 to the upper endpoint of the support S, yields
which implies property (iii).
Combining (A3) and (A2) gives
which implies property (i).
Proof of Lemma 1.
We consider the case of substitutes (1). The case of complements follows by mimicking the steps in the argument with permuted bidder identity.
First, we prove that b l (c) > b w (c). Let i (b) denote the inverse of the bid function for i = w, l. Theorem 1 in Bernard Lebrun (1999) establishes that bid functions are strictly increasing in costs and Theorem 2 in Lebrun (1999) establishes the existence of equilibrium with common bid support. Thus, the inverse of the bid function exists and is strictly increasing. We can write the payo of bidder w as
and it's associated necessary first order condition implies
Similarly, bidder l's payo is given by
and, the associated necessary first order condition implies Third, we establish the payo inqualities e w < F P w < F P l < e l . The interim expected equilibrium payo of a bidder of type i = l, w with cost c equals
. Now, the envelope theorem implies that d dc
As
, the interim expected payo can be written as
and, by definition, hold for all c S, they hold also ex ante, before costs are observed, which establishes the claim.
The final inequality that we need to establish is Now, the ex ante payo di erence can be written as: Proof of Theorem 1. By using equation (5), the di erence between the secondprice game payo and the first-price game payo , equals, 
